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A widespread view in macroeconomics holds that 
the effects of tight credit serve as a transmission 
belt that turns shocks in financial markets into 
shocks in the “real” economy. Adverse conditions 
for firms in credit markets curtail the economic ac-
tivity of those firms, and thereby cause economic 
shocks in financial markets to be amplified into 
real-world shocks affecting sales, inventories, and, 
ultimately, employment. Such conditions in credit 
markets may arise from contractionary monetary 
policy or from other events making credit costlier 
or less accessible. In the language of macroeco-
nomics, the credit difficulties of firms act as a 
financial accelerator.
In the past decade and a half, economists have 
presented evidence for this mechanism, paying 
special attention to small firms. Shocks in credit 
markets are found to have more serious negative 
effects on small firms than on large ones: Smaller 
firms, being more credit-constrained, feel the 
pinch of tight credit more acutely.
The recession of 2007–2009 was particularly re-
lated to dysfunctions in credit markets. Two of  
the authors of this Economic Brief, Marianna Kud-
lyak of the Richmond Fed and Juan M. Sánchez 
of the St. Louis Fed, have looked at data for this 
recession to determine whether firms responded 
to credit conditions in the third quarter of 2008 in 
a manner consistent with earlier scholarship. Their 
findings, which will be presented in a forthcoming 
paper, raise questions about the roles of small and 
large firms during periods of tight credit.
Probably the most influential paper assigning a 
central role to small firms is a 1994 article in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics by Mark Gertler 
of New York University and Simon Gilchrist of 
Boston University.1 Gertler and Gilchrist look at 
the behavior of small and large manufacturing 
firms around the time of five periods of contrac-
tionary monetary policy (in 1968, 1974, 1978, 
1979, and 1988) and one period of “credit crunch” 
(in 1966). They use a Census Bureau data set 
called the “Quarterly Financial Report for Manu-
facturing, Mining, and Wholesale Trade,” which 
provides financial data on various categories of 
firms, grouped by asset size. This data set does 
not break out data on individual firms, but it is 
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nonetheless highly useful to economists because it 
covers both publicly held and privately held firms in 
its aggregate statistics—unlike sources of firm-level 
data, which usually are limited to publicly traded 
companies. Gertler and Gilchrist define small firms as 
those at or below the 30th percentile in assets, and 
large firms as those above the 30th percentile.
The results of their empirical analysis indicate that 
the periods of tight money or credit have affected 
small and large firms differently: The short-term 
debt of small firms (consisting mainly of bank loans) 
declines while that of large firms (consisting mainly 
of commercial paper and bank loans) rises. The sales 
and inventories of small firms, moreover, decline 
much more than that of large firms. The researchers 
suggest that the results reflect that large firms enjoy 
easier access to credit, and that their access to credit 
enables them to borrow to carry inventories in spite 
of shocks in credit markets.
Kudlyak and Sánchez seek to determine whether 
these findings could be reproduced in the context 
of the  2007–2009 recession. First, they replicate the 
Gertler and Gilchrist results for the earlier periods 
(see row 4 of the table below). Then, using the same 
data set and methodology as Gertler and Gilchrist, 
they analyze data on short-term debt, sales, and in-
ventories around the third quarter of 2008. They find 
that the short-term debt of large firms decreases rela-
tive to that of small firms, and that the sales of large 
firms contract relative to small firms—the opposite  
of the findings for the earlier periods.
The table contains the findings on sales, inventories, 
and short-term debt. It shows the percentage de-
cline in the series between the start of a recession, 
as dated by NBER, and the following 12 quarters. Be-
cause the values in some cases continue to increase 
for a short time after the start of a recession, Kudlyak 
and Sánchez in those cases use the actual maximum 
achieved within a few quarters afterward. Row 1 
contains the results for the 2007–2009 recession, for 
which the peak of the series often coincided with the 
third quarter of 2008. As can be seen from the table, 
three quarters after the shock, the sales of large firms 
contracted much more than those of small firms. In 
terms of short-term debt, small firms lagged the large 
firms: While short-term debt of large firms peaked 
two quarters after the recession started, the peak in 
short-term debt of small firms was five quarters after 
the beginning of the recession. Thus, the difference 
between the peak and the trough in short-term 
debt of large firms, -18.62 percent, occurred over six 
quarters, while the difference for small firms, -8.85 
percent, happened over only three quarters. As new 
data become available, it will be possible to learn 
more about the long-run effect of the shock.
Change between Trough and Peak around the NBER Recessions and Tight Money Dates 
  Sales  Inventories  Short-term Debt
  Large Small  Large Small  Large  Small
2007–2009 Recession**  -14.94 -10.01  -6.23  -6.93  -18.62  -8.85
2001 Recession*  -15.33  -8.78  -13.36 -10.46  -36.95  -12.5
All Recessions pre–2001***  -7.73 -7.97  -5.11 -5.82  -20.44 -7.86
Tight Money Dates****  -3.11 -6.44  -1.97 -6.05  -8.88 -11.12
Note:   The table contains the differences between the minimum value of the detrended series in an  
interval of 12 quarters following the episode and the value at the peak of the series. 
 
(*) The peak of the recession is 2001:Q1. 
(**) The peak of the recession is 2007:Q4. 
(***) The peaks of the included recessions are: 1969:Q4, 1973:Q4, 1980:Q1, 1981:Q3, and 1990:Q3. 
(****) Tight money periods are 1968:Q4, 1974:Q2, 1978:Q3, 1979:Q4, 1988:Q4, and 1994:Q2.  
See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994, QJE) for the details.Page 3
To understand whether the patterns described above 
are specific to the  2007–2009 episode, Kudlyak and 
Sánchez then look at data for the 2001 recession (see 
row 2 of the table). There, too, they find that large 
firms take on relatively less short-term debt com-
pared to small firms, and that the sales and invento-
ries of large firms contract relative to small firms—
the same pattern as in the recessionary period of the 
third quarter of 2008.
These findings are related to the work in progress by 
V. V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe of the University of 
Minnesota and the Minneapolis Fed and Lawrence J. 
Christiano of Northwestern University,2 who applied 
the Gertler-Gilchrist methodology to 10 business 
cycles between 1953 and 2000. Chari, Kehoe, and 
Christiano find that in those business cycles, taken  
together, there is not a significant difference in the 
responses of large and small firms to recessions.  
(Row 3 of the table replicates the results of the exer-
cise.) Based on their findings, Chari, Kehoe, and  
Christiano build a model to try to reconcile their 
findings with those of Gertler and Gilchrist. Examin-
ing the individual recession episodes more closely, 
Kudlyak and Sánchez’s study suggests that during 
the recent episodes, large firms were likely hurt 
more than small ones. This finding is consistent with 
the recent work by Giuseppe Moscarini and Fabien 
Postel-Vinay, who find that in the 1990 and the 2001 
recessions, large firms were hit particularly hard in 
terms of employment.3 
These findings invite further research into the role  
of small firms in contractions, whether those con- 
tractions are the result of worsening credit condi-
tions or other shocks. The findings as to periods  
of tight monetary policy—with firms behaving  
differently in 2007–2009 than in earlier periods of 
worsening credit—suggest that the economy of 
2008 did not entirely fit the longstanding model  
in which small firms contract more than large firms 
in response to credit shocks, and that the contrac-
tion of small firms is responsible for the amplification 
of these shocks. This, together with the findings in 
Chari, Kehoe, and Christiano’s research, suggests that 
new or different forces may have been affecting the 
behavior of firms in those recessions.
One possibility that could be explored is whether 
large firms in the recent periods of tight money or 
recession faced greater credit constraints than has 
historically been the case—for example, because 
large firms were more highly leveraged, which in  
turn leads to the large firms being more heavily  
constrained by the availability of credit. Other expla-
nations may emerge for the new patterns observed 
in Kudlyak and Sánchez’s study.
Marianna Kudlyak is an economist and David A. Price 
is a writer in the Research Department at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond. Juan M. Sánchez is an 
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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